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Abstract
This paper compares relative performance evaluation via tournaments to absolute
performance evaluation via piece rates when agents are heterogeneous ex post, to make the
point that agent heterogeneity compromises the insurance function of tournaments. In
particular, we show that the more heterogeneous agents are the less insurance can be offered
through tournaments and the less dominant tournaments are over piece rates. Thus, absolute
performance piece rates should be preferred when agents are highly heterogeneous. However,
even with heterogeneous agents, tournaments become more desirable when the number of
agents or the uncertainty about the common shock increases sufficiently.
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Beginning with the seminal work of Lazear and Rosen (1981), Holmstr￿m (1982), Green
and Stockey (1983) and Nalebu⁄ and Stiglitz (1983), contrasting tournaments to piece
rates mirrors contrasting relative performance to absolute performance evaluation. Relative
performance evaluation is justi￿ed by the fact that, when agent production activities are
subject to a common shock, individual performance is not a su¢ cient statistic for individual
e⁄ort. The performance levels obtained by the rest of the agents convey an informative
signal about the common shock and, therefore, the e⁄ort choice of any given agent. Lazear
and Rosen, in particular, show that when agents have a CARA utility function and there
is no common uncertainty piece rates dominate tournaments. By contrast, with large com-
mon uncertainty tournaments dominate. The rationale for this highly acclaimed result is
that tournaments allow the principal to remove the common shock from the responsibility of
agents. Tournaments constitute a move closer to the First Best because the principal uses the
available information more e¢ ciently. By removing common uncertainty from the respon-
sibility of agents, and by charging a premium for this insurance, the principal increases his
pro￿t without hurting the agents. What has received little attention, though, is that when
agents are heterogeneous relative performance evaluation via tournaments exposes agents to
uncertainty about the average agent ability.1
We measure agent heterogeneity by the variance of agent ability. When this variance
increases, agents are more heterogeneous because the realizations of their ability types are
drawn from a more disperse distribution and, at the same time, the variability in individual
output increases. The analysis then shows that the more heterogeneous agents are the less
insurance can be o⁄ered through tournaments and the less dominant tournaments are over
piece rates. Thus, tournaments become less desirable when the variance of the distribution of
ability types is large, so that absolute performance piece rates are preferred when agents are
highly heterogeneous. However, even with heterogeneous agents, tournaments become more
desirable when the number of agents or the uncertainty about the common shock increases
su¢ ciently. The rationale is that, unlike piece rates, tournaments ￿lter away common uncer-
tainty from the responsibility of agents who pay a premium for this insurance. Tournaments
expose agents to the idiosyncratic shocks of other agents, but the average idiosyncratic shock
is nulli￿ed with more agents because some shocks will be positive and some will be negative.
1Konrad and Kovenock (2006) examine discriminating contests in which contestants￿abilities are sto-
chastic but become common knowledge before agents choose e⁄orts. Tsoulouhas et al (2007) consider CEO
contests that are open to heterogeneous outsider contestants, to analyze the trade o⁄ between incentives
and selection. Kolmar and Sisak (2007) analyze discriminating contests among heterogeneous contestants to
guarantee e¢ cient contributions to a public good. Riis (2007) shows that when agents are heterogeneous ex
ante and the optimal discriminatory prize premium is non-monotonic in ability, e¢ ciency can be restored if
agents choose from a menu.
1Both piece rates and tournaments expose an agent to uncertainty about his own ability but
only tournaments expose him to uncertainty from the fact that his ability may di⁄er from
the average ability of other agents. Thus, the removal of common uncertainty from the
agents￿responsibility under tournament has a negative impact on their required compen-
sation but, on the other hand, the introduction of uncertainty due to heterogeneity has a
positive impact. When the variance of ability is relatively large, the addition of uncertainty
from heterogeneity can outweigh the reduction of uncertainty from common shocks. Further,
in this case common uncertainty against which tournaments can insure is a smaller fraction
of total uncertainty.
2. The model
A principal signs a contract with n agents. Agent i produces output according to the pro-
duction function xi = ai + ei + ￿ + "i, where ai is the agent￿ s ability, ei is his e⁄ort, ￿ is a
common shock in￿ icted on all agents and "i is an idiosyncratic shock. Agents do not know
their ability types at the time of contracting; instead, they privately learn their types ex
post. In particular, agents discover how good they are in this activity after contracts are
stipulated and before selecting e⁄ort.2 Each agent￿ s e⁄ort and the subsequent realizations
of the production shocks are private information, but the output obtained is publicly ob-
served. The price of output is normalized to 1. Each agent￿ s type follows an i.i.d. normal
distribution with mean ￿ and variance ￿2
a. The common shock follows a normal distribution
with mean zero and variance ￿2
￿. The idiosyncratic shock for each agent follows an i.i.d.
normal distribution with mean zero and variance ￿2
". The distributions of ai, ￿ and "i are
independent. The principal compensates agents for their e⁄ort based on their outputs by
using a piece rate contract or a tournament. Agent preferences are represented by a CARA






; where r is the agent￿ s coe¢ cient of absolute
risk aversion and wi is the compensation to agent i. Given the normality assumptions above,
both xi and wi are normally distributed and, therefore, u(￿) follows a lognormal distribution,
which allows us to obtain analytical solutions.
3. The piece rate contract
The piece rate contract (R) is the payment scheme in which the compensation to agent i
takes the form wi = bR + ￿Rxi. The principal determines the contractual parameters by
2This is more interesting than the case when individual abilities are observed after e⁄orts are exerted,
because ability could then be summed up with all idiosyncratic shocks. Further, abstracting from the case
when agents know their types at the time of contracting allows us to examine the full impact of heterogeneity
on the form of the contract. Under adverse selection, instead, if the principal o⁄ered a menu of contracts
and agents self-selected, agents might not be exposed to the full impact of uncertainty about average ability.
See Bhattacharya and Guash (1988) and Riis (2007) for such heterogeneity.
2backward induction. First, the principal calculates each agent￿ s expected utility after he










































where the expression in the square brackets is the certainty equivalent compensation. To
ensure the compatibility of the contract with agent incentives to perform, the principal
calculates the e⁄ort level that maximizes (1). First order conditions yield
e
￿
i = ￿R; (2)
which implies that incentives to perform are fully determined by the incentives provided by
the principal via the piece rate ￿R. Note that, when both ability and e⁄ort add to output and
hence to expected compensation, ability does not a⁄ect the e⁄ort choice of the agent. Given
(2), to ensure the compatibility of the contract with agent incentives to participate before
they learn their types, the principal selects the value of the base payment, bR, that satis￿es
the agent￿ s individual rationality constraint with equality so that he receives no rents but
































R ￿ ￿￿R: (3)
By setting bR in accordance with (3) the principal can induce agent participation at least




[Exi ￿ Ewi] = n
￿



















3that is, the larger the variances of ability, common shock and idiosyncratic shock, the lower
the piece rate because the weaker the link between the power of incentives and output.













that is, expected agent ability has a negative impact on the base payment because more
able agents need weaker incentives to participate. The principal￿ s expected pro￿t per agent
under the piece rate is








The tournament (T) is the payment scheme in which the compensation to each agent is
determined by relative performance. Speci￿cally,












where x is the average output obtained by all agents. Note that the total wage bill is
proportional to the base payment bT: ￿wi = nbT: Thus, in contrast to the piece rate contract,
the principal￿ s total payment to the agents and, hence, the expected payment per agent are
independent of output, however, each agent￿ s relative performance determines his share of
the ￿xed total payments. The agent￿ s expected utility after he signs the contract and learns




































































































































































Note that neither the bonus factor ￿T nor the base payment bT depend on ￿2
￿ because the
principal ￿lters away common shocks from the responsibility of agents. Also note that
￿T > ￿R; (14)
that is, the removal of common uncertainty from the agent￿ s responsibility enables the prin-









Unlike the piece rate, the base payment does not depend on the expected agent ability under
tournament. This is because the expected payment under tournament does not depend on
the expected agent ability. The principal￿ s expected pro￿t per agent is










5. The dominant contract
The principal￿ s decision about which payment scheme to o⁄er depends entirely on expected
pro￿ts. Conditions (7) and (16) imply:













5First note that, interestingly, expected agent ability does not a⁄ect the form of the dominant
contract. Second, condition (17) indicates that tournaments are optimal provided that the
variance of the common shock is larger than only a fraction of the variance of agent ability
and the variance of the idiosyncratic shock, where the fraction decreases when the number
of agents increases. Thus, the odds would be cast in favor of tournaments if common uncer-
tainty equaled the uncertainty in agent ability plus idiosyncratic uncertainty. By the strong
law of large numbers, a large number of agents strengthens the dominance of tournaments
because average agent ability converges almost surely to the population mean ability, and
idiosyncratic shocks cancel out, which enables the principal to o⁄er better insurance by ￿l-
tering away common shocks from the responsibility of agents through the average output.
Therefore, piece rates are dominant when the number of agents is su¢ ciently small, or the
uncertainties in agent ability or idiosyncratic shocks are large, or when the uncertainty about
the common shock is su¢ ciently small. Our ￿nding invites an empirical investigation of the
magnitudes of these uncertainties.
6. The dominant contract when ability a⁄ects the cost of e⁄ort







: An agent￿ s optimal e⁄ort is now a function of ability
because higher ability reduces the cost of e⁄ort. Thus,
e
￿
i = ai￿R; (18)







for a tournament. The remaining analysis gets messy pretty quickly. In particular, under











































R = 0; (21)
and the principal￿ s expected pro￿t per agent is
E￿R = ￿ ￿ ￿￿
2
R ￿ bR: (22)





















































































and the principal￿ s expected pro￿t per agent is
E￿T = ￿ +
n ￿ 1
n
￿￿T ￿ bT: (25)
The range of variance of ability over which tournaments dominate piece rates, from the
perspective of the principal, is larger than the corresponding range when ability does not
a⁄ect the cost of e⁄ort.3 This can easily be demonstrated by a numerical example. We
set ￿2
￿ = ￿2
" = 1; r = 2; ￿ = 0:5 and n = 5: As shown in Figure 1, when the cost of
e⁄ort does not depend on ability, tournaments are optimal for 0 ￿ ￿2
a < 3; however, when
ability reduces the cost of e⁄ort, tournaments are optimal for 0 ￿ ￿2
a < 4:28: The rationale
is that, when ability a⁄ects the cost of e⁄ort, the agents are being subjected to more risk
and they also behave as if they were more risk-averse (i.e., even though the coe¢ cient of
absolute risk aversion has not changed, the utility function is more concave because the cost
of e⁄ort is monetized). Therefore, tournaments are optimal for higher ￿2
a values because the
principal can charge more for insurance against common shocks. Note that an increase in
the variance of ability still favors piece rates, similar to the analysis above when the cost of
e⁄ort did not depend on ability. Also note that the variance of ability and the variance of
idiosyncratic shocks are now given di⁄erent weights in determining the dominant contract,
with the variance of ability being given a larger weight, unlike the case when ability did not
a⁄ect e⁄ort (see condition (17) where the weights were equal). It is easy to to see this by
comparing conditions (20) to (3), and (23) to (11).
7. Conclusion
The literature on tournaments or contests, including Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and
Stockey (1983) and Nalebu⁄ and Stiglitz (1983), and more recently Konrad and Kovenock
3Also note that expected ability ￿ now a⁄ects the choice of dominant contract (but the direction depends
on the parameter values). This is because when the cost of e⁄ort depends on ability, then, the choice of
e⁄ort depends on ability, hence, the choice of contract depends on expected ability.
7Figure 1: Expected pro￿t per agent under piece rates and tournaments for di⁄erent values
of the variance of ability, when ability does not a⁄ect the cost of e⁄ort (left panel) and when
it does (right panel).
(2006), Tsoulouhas et al (2007) and Riis (2007), has ignored the fact that when agents
are heterogeneous relative performance evaluation exposes agents to uncertainty about the
average agent ability. This paper compares relative performance evaluation via tournaments
to absolute performance evaluation via piece rates when agents are heterogeneous ex post,
and shows that agent heterogeneity compromises the insurance function of tournaments. In
particular, the analysis shows that tournaments become less desirable when the variance of
the distribution of ability types is large, so that absolute performance piece rates should be
preferred when agents are highly heterogeneous. However, even with heterogeneous agents,
tournaments become more desirable when the number of agents or the uncertainty about
the common shock increases su¢ ciently.
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